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Proper policy to deal with pollution resulting from the production of goods has occupied economists for 
many years.  The Pigovian approach of taxing the output of polluting goods (or, more properly, the 
pollution from those goods) has been established as the First Best solution to the problem.  However, 
pollution taxes face substantial political opposition.  Often, as in the case of energy production, a less-
polluting or non-polluting alternative exists, and subsidies for these sources are politically very attractive.  
A number of recent studies have examined, in various contexts, the notion that taxes on polluting goods 
and subsidies for non-polluting substitutes could be employed simultaneously1.  This paper uses a simple 
linear partial equilibrium model of a competitive industry in which some sources emit a certain amount 
of pollution per unit of the good produced, while others emit no pollution.  (The goods produced by 
polluting firms are perfect substitutes for those produced by non-polluting firms.) This specification 
allows straightforward calculation of the net social benefit (NSB) resulting from various policy 
approaches.  As expected, a tax on the polluting sources equal to the Marginal External Cost resulting 
from producing a unit of the good (and no subsidy to non-polluting sources) maximizes NSB.  Other 
combinations of taxes on polluting sources and subsidies for non-polluting sources are also evaluated.  It 
is possible to find the best level of subsidy, corresponding to any chosen level of tax and to compare the 
NSB for all alternatives.  It is also possible to calculate the best level of tax, given any level of subsidy. 
The recent interest in combining taxes on heavy emitters with subsidies for those who emit less is 
exemplified by Galinato and Yoder (Galitano and Yoder 2010), who developed a general equilibrium 
model to estimate the welfare effects of taxing heavy emitters of greenhouse gases and subsidizing low 
emitters while limiting the dollar amount of subsidies to be no greater than the amount of tax revenue 
collected from heavy emitters.  They find that the system they examine generates social benefits that 
fall short of those obtainable by employing a Pigovian tax system.  Gilbert Metcalf (Metcalf 2009) 
discusses the many problems that subsidizing low-carbon technologies (rather than taxing high-carbon 
technologies) encounters and points out that a Pigovian tax on pollution (instead of subsidies for non-
pollution) would resolve most, if not all, of those problems.  My model (and illustrative numerical 
example) limits itself to a single industry (such as energy production) and uses a simple partial 
equilibrium linear demand and supply apparatus to evaluate outcomes.  Instead of limiting subsidies for 
“clean” sources to be no greater than tax revenue collected from “dirty” sources, as Galinato and Yoder 
do, the model calculates the constrained optimal (NSB-maximizing) subsidy to provide to the clean 
sources, given any level of tax assessed on the dirty sources. 
In addition to showing that a Pigovian tax on dirty sources (and no subsidy for clean sources) maximizes 
NSB, the model calculates how much lower NSB would be if any combination of taxes and corresponding 
subsidies would be, compared to the fully optimal solution.  A surprising result is that, given any level of 
tax on the dirty source, the optimal corresponding subsidy results in the same amount of the clean good 
as would result if the fully optimal tax were imposed (with no subsidy for the clean sources).  Similarly, if 
the subsidy is set at any arbitrary level, the model calculates the level of tax that would maximize NSB, 
given the level of the subsidy.  The level of tax on dirty sources that maximizes NSB, given any arbitrary 
level of subsidy for clean sources, results in the same amount of the dirty output as would result if only a 
tax on dirty sources (and no subsidy for clean sources) were imposed.  The results of the two 
approaches (choose optimal subsidy, given a level of tax vs. choose optimal tax, given a level of subsidy) 
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do not give the same answer.  For example, given the parameters in my example (in which the Marginal 
External Cost of output from dirty sources equals $25), if a tax of $15 per unit is imposed on dirty 
sources, the optimal subsidy for clean sources would be $5.71, but if a subsidy of $5.71 is provided to 
clean sources, the optimal tax on dirty sources would be $20.43.   
The sum of the tax on dirty sources plus the subsidy for clean sources tells us the difference between 
the effective price received by clean and dirty sources.  In order for the total output to be produced 
cost-effectively (at lowest aggregate cost), those prices should differ by an amount equal to the 
Marginal External Cost (MEC).  For any outcome other than the case where the dirty sources are 
assessed a tax equal to MEC (with no subsidy to the clean sources), the output is not produced cost-
effectively.  When a tax (less than MEC) is specified first, then the optimal subsidy is calculated, the sum 
of the tax and subsidy will be less than the MEC, meaning that, given the total output produced, its 
aggregate cost would be lower if less of it were produced by dirty sources and more by clean sources.  
On the other hand, when the subsidy for clean energy is specified first, then the tax on dirty sources is 
chosen so as to maximize NSB, the sum of the subsidy and the tax exceeds the MEC.  This means that 
the total cost of the output that is produced would be lower if less were produced from clean sources 
and more from dirty sources. 
Although it does not seem realistic to suppose that one branch of government is in charge of 
establishing taxes on dirty sources, while another branch is in charge of setting the subsidy for clean 
sources, it may be useful imagine this arrangement.  The tax-setting branch is assumed to set the tax so 
as to maximize Net Social Benefit, given the subsidy that has been established.  Similarly, the subsidy-
setting branch is assumed to set the subsidy so as to maximize Net Social Benefit, given the tax that has 
been established.  Viewing the situation this way makes it a game, and the Nash equilibrium would be 
the outcome at which each branch is making its decision to maximize NSB, given what the other branch 
is doing.  The Nash equilibrium outcome turns out to be characterized by a tax on dirty sources equal to 
MEC and no subsidy. 
The Model and Numerical Example 
The linear model employed in this paper can be expressed by the demand curve for the good exhibited 
by consumers, the supply curves of the two types of sources for the good (regular—or “dirty”—and 
alternative—or “clean”), and the Total External Cost (TEC) function.  For some purposes, it is helpful to 
specify values for the parameters, so that illustrative numerical answers can be obtained.  The equations 
are as follows: 
Pc = h -j∙QT, where QT is the sum of output from dirty and clean sources, and h and j are positive 
constants.  In the example, h = 100 and j = 2. 
The inverse supply curve for the “regular” or dirty is source is  
Pr = a + b∙Qr (a and b are positive constants).  In the example, a = 10 and b = 1.5. 
The inverse supply curve for the “alternative” or clean source is  
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Pa = e + f∙Qa (e and f are positive constants).  In the example, e = 35 and f = 0.5. 
The Total External Cost (TEC) = Qr∙MEC, where MEC is a positive constant.  In the example, MEC = $25.
2 
The objective is to maximize Net Social Benefit (NSB), subject to various constraints. 
NSB = PSr + PSa + CS – TEC + Tax Revenue – Total Subsidies Paid
3 
Prior to investigating alternative tax and/or subsidy interventions, we can calculate the outcome of an 
unregulated market (no tax on regulated sources and no subsidy for alternative sources).  The results 
are as follows: 
Pc = Pr = Pa = 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 = $40 
(The subscripts refer to prices paid by consumers, received by regular suppliers, and received by 
alternative suppliers, respectively.) 
Given the price,  
Qr = 
   
 
 = 20 
Qa = 
   
 
 = 10 
Qd = Qr + Qa = 30 
CS = h∙Qd – 0.5∙j∙Qd
2 –P∙Qd = 900 
PSr = P∙Qr –(a∙Qr + 0.5∙b∙Qr
2) = 300 
PSa = P∙Qa – (e∙Qa +0.5∙f∙Qa
2) = 25 
TEC = MEC∙Qr = $500 
NSB = CS + PSr + PSa – TEC = $725. 
If subsidies for alternative sources of S, per unit, are provided and taxes of T, per unit are imposed on 
regular sources, NSB becomes 
NSB = CS + PSr + PSa – TEC + Tax Revenue – Total Subsidies Paid 
Given any level of subsidy provided for alternative sources, what tax on regular (dirty) sources would be 
optimal?4  One way to arrive at that answer is to set the partial derivative of NSB with respect to T equal 
to zero and solve for T.  The solution to that equation is 
T = MEC – 
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If S = 0, then the optimal tax on regular (dirty) sources equals MEC. 
This is the familiar Pigovian result.  Given the illustrative parameter values, the outcome when a tax 
equal to MEC is imposed on regular suppliers (and no subsidy is provided to alternative producers), the 
results are as follows: 
T = MEC = $25 
Pc = Pa = 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  = $45.263 
Pr = Pa – T = $20.263 
Qr = 
    
 
     6.842 
Qa = 
    
 
   = 20.526 
QT =Qr + Qa =  Qd = 27.368 
TEC = MEC∙Qr = $171.053 
CS = h∙Qd – 0.5∙j∙Qd
2 –Pc∙Qd = $749.031 
PSr = Pr∙Qr –(a∙Qr + 0.5∙b∙Qr
2) = $35.111 
PSa = Pa∙Qa – (e∙Qa +0.5∙f∙Qa
2) = $105.332 
Tax Revenue = T∙Qr =$171.053 
NSB = $889.474 
No other tax would achieve a higher level of NSB.  This is shown by the fact that 
    
  
 = 
   
  
 
    
  
 
    
  
  
    
  
 
       
  
  
   
  
    
   
  
    
   
  
    (     
   
  
)      
   
  
 = 0 when T = 
MEC = $25. 
If taxation of regular (dirty) sources is politically impossible, but subsidies for alternative (clean) sources 
can be imposed, then NSB would be given by CS + PSr + PSa – TEC – Total Subsidy Paid.  The highest NSB 
would be achieved where 
    
  
 = 
   
  
 
    
  
 
    
  
  
    
  
 
              
  
  
   
  
    
   
  
    
   
  
    (     
   
  
)      
   
  
 = 0. 
The general solution to this equation, when T is positive, is S = 
  (     )
   
.  If T = 0, then the optimal S is 
given by S = 
  (   )
   
.  Given the parameter values in our example, the results are as follows: 
S = $14.286 
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Pc = Pr = 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 =$30.977 
Pa =Pc + S = $45.263 
Qr = 
    
 
     13.985 
Qa = 
    
 
    = 20.526 
QT =Qr + Qa =  Qd = 34.511 
TEC = MEC∙Qr = $349.624 
CS = h∙Qd – 0.5∙j∙Qd
2 –Pc∙Qd = $1191.028 
PSr = Pr∙Qr –(a∙Qr + 0.5∙b∙Qr
2) = $146.684 
PSa = Pa∙Qa – (e∙Qa +0.5∙f∙Qa
2) = $105.332 
Total Subsidy = S∙Qa =$293.233 
NSB = $800.188 
Note that NSB is smaller with the “optimal” subsidy for alternative sources (and no tax on regular 
sources) than it would be with a Pigovian tax on regular sources (and no subsidy for alternative sources).  
Note also that since the optimal S, given any T, is S = 
  (     )
   
, if T = MEC, the optimal S = 0. 
What about other combinations of taxes on dirty sources and subsidies for clean sources?  For example, 
suppose political considerations allow the tax (T) to be set at $15 per unit of dirty output.  The optimal 
subsidy (S) per unit of clean output would be S = 
  (     )
   
 .  Given the values of the parameters in our 
example, the S that maximizes NSB would be S = $5.714, resulting in  
Pc  = 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 =$39.549 
Pr = Pc –T = $24.549 
Pa =Pc + S = $45.263 
Qr = 
    
 
     9.699 
Qa = 
    
 
    = 20.526 
QT =Qr + Qa =  Qd = 30.226 
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TEC = MEC∙Qr = $242.481 
CS = h∙Qd – 0.5∙j∙Qd
2 –Pc∙Qd = $913.585 
PSr = Pr∙Qr –(a∙Qr + 0.5∙b∙Qr
2) = $70.557 
PSa = Pa∙Qa – (e∙Qa +0.5∙f∙Qa
2) = $105.332 
Total Subsidy = S∙Qa =$117.188 
Total Tax Collected = T∙Qr = $145.489 
NSB = $875.188 
As T increases (and S decreases in response), NSB increases, although it still falls short of the level when 
T = MEC and S = 0.  The accompanying table and diagram show the relationship between T (and the 
corresponding S) and NSB. 
Tax Subsidy NSB 
0 14.28571 800.188 
5 11.42857 832.331 
10 8.571429 857.331 
15 5.714286 875.188 
20 2.857143 885.902 
25 0 889.474 
 
 
Figure 1  Relationship between Tax and Net Social Benefit 
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A surprising feature of the linear model is that when S is chosen to maximize NSB, given any value for T, 
then Pa—the effective price received by suppliers of alternative (clean) good—is invariant to changes in 
T.  This means that the quantity of alternative good produced is the same, regardless of the value of T, 
as long as S is set so as to maximize NSB, given whatever T is chosen.  The amount of alternative good 
produced in all cases is equal to the amount that would be produced with a Pigovian tax of T on regular 
sources (and no subsidy for alternative sources). 
Proof that Pa (and therefore Qa) is invariant to changes in T 
We start with the expression for Pc (the price consumers pay).  We get this from the equilibrium in the 
markets, given T and S. 
Supply 
Regular (dirty):       Alternative (clean): 
Pr = a + bQr Pa = e + fQa 
Qr = (Pr – a)/b Qa = (Pa – e)/f 
Pr= Pc - T Pa = Pc + S 
Qr = (Pc – a – T)/b Qa = (Pc + S – e)/f 
 
QT  = Qr + Qa 
      
 
 
      
 
 
Demand 
Pc = h – j∙(Qa + Qr) = h – j∙(QT) => QT = (h – Pc)/j 
Equilibrium 
    
 
 
      
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
   
 
    (
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
   
   
  
   
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
                   
   
        
   
 
                   
        
 
Since Pa = Pc + S, 
Pa 
                      (        )
        
 
                  (     )
        
 
This expression shows that Pa depends on T and S, but we also assume that we adjust S, given any value 
for T, so as to reach the highest possible level of NSB, so S depends on T. 
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We are interested in 
 
   
  
 
   
  
 
   
  
 
  
  
 
Using the expression above for Pa: 
   
  
 
  
        
 
   
  
 
     
        
 
 (   )
        
 
Recall that the optimal S, given any T, is given by: 
  
 
   
 (     ) 
Then  
  
  
 
  
   
 
So 
   
  
  
  
        
  
 (   )
        
 
  
   
  
  
        
  
  
        
   
Setting the Subsidy first, then the Tax 
If the subsidy for alternative sources is set at any particular level, there is an “optimal” tax that would 
maximize NSB, given the level of the subsidy.  As noted above, the optimal T, given any S can be 
obtained by setting the derivative of NSB with respect to T equal to zero and solving the resulting 
equation.  Using this procedure, we find that T = MEC - 
   
   
 .  Then  
  
  
   
 
   
 .  Given the values of the 
parameters in the example, 
  
  
 = - 0.8.  If S = 0, the optimal T = MEC = $25.  As S increases, the optimal T 
falls by $.80 for every $1 increase in S.  This means that S + T > MEC.  (More on this below.) 
For example, if the subsidy is set at S = $10, then the optimal tax will be T = MEC - 
   
   
 = $17. 
Pc = 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 =$37.263 
Pr = Pc – T = $20.263 
Pa =Pc + S = $47.263 
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Qr = 
    
 
     6.842 
Qa = 
    
 
    = 24.526 
QT =Qr + Qa =  Qd = 31.368 
TEC = MEC∙Qr = $171.053 
CS = h∙Qd – 0.5∙j∙Qd
2 –Pc∙Qd = $983.978 
PSr = Pr∙Qr –(a∙Qr + 0.5∙b∙Qr
2) = $35.111 
PSa = Pa∙Qa – (e∙Qa +0.5∙f∙Qa
2) = $150.385 
Total Tax Collected = T∙Qr = $116.316 
Total Subsidy = S∙Qa =$245.263 
NSB = $869.474 
Just as Pa (and as a result Qa) is invariant to changes in T, when S is adjusted optimally, so Pr (and as a 
result Qr) is invariant to changes in S, when T is adjusted optimally. 
Using the same approach as above, we can show that Pr = 
                          (        )
        
 
When we take the total derivative of Pr with respect to S, we find that regardless of the value of S, T is 
adjusted so that Pr is unaffected by the value of S.  Thus the amount of Qr supplied will be the same, 
regardless of the level of S, as long as T is adjusted optimally in response to the level of S. 
   
  
 
   
  
 
   
  
 
  
  
 
 
   
  
 
   
        
 
           
        
 
  
   
 
   
        
 
  
        
   
Cost Effectiveness 
If we (for political reasons) set T at $15, the S that maximizes Net Social Benefit is S = 
  (     )
   
 = 
$5.714, given the illustrative values chosen for the example.  But if S is set at $5.714, the value of T that 
maximizes NSB is MEC – 
   
   
 =25 – 0.8∙(5.714) = $20.429, given the values assumed.  Furthermore, the 
sum of S and T will be different if T is set first than if S is determined first.  If T is set arbitrarily and then S 
is chosen so as to maximize NSB, the sum of S and T will be T + S = 
 
   
       
 
   
 .   Thus T+S is a 
weighted average of MEC and T, with the weights equal to 
 
   
 and 
 
   
 , respectively.  As long as T < MEC, 
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T+S < MEC.  If T = 0, T+ S = 
 
   
     .  The fact that T+ S < MEC means that the allocation of total 
output of the good is not cost-effective:  it does not minimize the aggregate cost of producing the total 
output in question.  This is because cost-effectiveness is achieved when the Marginal Social Cost of 
producing another unit of output from traditional sources (the Marginal Private Cost plus the MEC) 
equals the Marginal Social Cost of producing another unit from alternative sources.  Since traditional 
suppliers equate their MPC to Pr and alternative suppliers equate their MPC = MSC to Pa, then Pa – Pr = S 
+ T must equal MEC.  If T is chosen first, followed by S, then T+S < MEC, which means “too much” of the 
total output produced comes from traditional sources.  Similarly, if S is chosen first, followed by a 
selection of T to maximize NSB, then S+T > MEC.  Recall that the NSB-maximizing value of T, given S, is 
        
 
   
.  Then       (  
 
   
)        This means that the aggregate cost of 
producing the total output that is produced not minimized—too much of it is being produced by 
alternative suppliers and not enough by traditional suppliers. 
Policy Choices as a “Game”? 
The fact that the two approaches to establishing S and T do not give the same answers suggests that we 
might get some insight into the problem by envisioning the policy setting process as a game.  Perhaps 
we could imagine that one branch of government is responsible for setting taxes on polluters, while 
another has responsibility for establishing subsidies for non-polluting firms.  Imagine that each operates 
independently, and neither can do the other’s job.  Given the parameters of the example we have been 
using in this paper, we can determine the “best response” of the subsidizing agency (a particular value 
of S) to any tax (T) set by the taxing agency.  Similarly we can determine the best response of the taxing 
agency (a certain value of T) to any level of S set by the subsidizing agency.  As we showed earlier, S* 
 
 
   
 (     ) and 
   
  
   
 
   
 .  Similarly T*=      (
 
   
) and 
   
  
 ( 
 
   
).  Figure 2 
shows the two best response lines in a space with T on the horizontal axis and S on the vertical. 
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Taxing authority’s best response 
curve:  T* = MEC – S∙(j/(j+f)).  dT*/dS 
= -j/(j+f) = -0.8.  dS/dT* = -(j+f)/j = -
1.25 
b = 1.5 
f = 0.5 
j = 2  
Subsidizing authority’s best response 
curve: S* = (j/(j+b))∙(MEC – T). 
dS*/dT = -j/(j+b) = -0.57 
14.29 
31.25 
25 
T 
S 
13.57 
6.53 
Nash 
equilibrium 
Figure 2.  Showing the interaction between “optimal” tax and “optimal” 
subsidy as a game. 
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We can see how the “game” might work if we note that, if T were zero, the best S would be 14.29.  On 
the other hand, if the subsidizing authority were to set a subsidy for clean energy of 14.29, the taxing 
authority would find that its best tax would be T* = 13.57.  But if the taxing authority set a tax of 13.57, 
the subsidy that would maximize NSB would be S* = 6.53.  In response to that subsidy, the best tax 
would be 19.78.  The process would continue, as indicated by the arrow lines.  The one location where 
the taxing authority is setting the best tax it can, given S, and the subsidizing authority is setting the best 
subsidy it can, given T, is the point with T = 25 (equal to MEC) and S = 0.  Since each authority is doing 
the best it can, given what the other authority is doing, this outcome appears to be a Nash equilibrium.  
Unlike many Nash equilibria, this one is fully efficient. 
Conclusion 
This paper attempts to gain insight into the issues involved in taxing polluting suppliers and/or 
subsidizing non-polluting suppliers of the same good by creating a simple linear demand and supply 
model for an industry with polluting and non-polluting suppliers.  The output of the polluting suppliers 
generates a constant Marginal External Cost (MEC).  As others have shown, the first best policy response 
is to impose a Pigovian tax equal to MEC on the output of polluting suppliers.  This policy results in the 
highest level of Net Social Benefit (NSB), consisting of the Producer Surpluses of the two types of 
suppliers, Consumer Surplus and Tax Revenue, minus Total Exernal Costs imposed by polluters and 
subsidies paid, if any.  If imposition of the full Pigovian tax is politically infeasible, the provision of a 
subsidy for non-polluting sources can increase NSB, relative to the non-intervention equilibrium and 
relative to the case with only a tax T < MEC, but the largest NSB obtainable by this policy is less than 
would be achieved with the appropriate Pigovian tax.  There is an “optimal” subsidy corresponding to 
any level of Pigovian tax.  As the size of the tax increases, the optimal subsidy decreases, and NSB 
increases, but no level of tax other than MEC (and zero subsidy) gives as large an NSB as T = MEC and S = 
0.  If the subsidy is chosen to maximize NSB, given the level of tax, the effective price suppliers of non-
polluting goods receive (and therefore the amount of non-polluting good produced) is unaffected by the 
size of the tax.  The sum of tax and subsidy, when the subsidy is chosen so as to maximize NSB (given the 
level of tax) is less than MEC, unless T = MEC.  This means that the mix of polluting and non-polluting 
outputs is not cost effective and contains too much of the polluting good. 
If the tax on polluting output is set so as to maximize NSB, given the level of subsidy imposed, the 
effective price suppliers of polluting good receive (and therefore the amount of polluting good produced) 
is unaffected by the size of the subsidy.  The sum of tax and subsidy, when tax is chosen so as to 
maximize NSB (given the level of subsidy) is greater than MEC, unless S = 0.  This means that the mix of 
polluting and non-polluting outputs is not cost effective and contains too much of the non-polluting 
good. 
The interaction of government decision makers, one of whom attempts to maximize NSB by setting S, 
given the level of T, and the other of whom attempts to maximize NSB by setting T, given S, can be 
viewed as a game.  The Nash equilibrium of the game appears to be the outcome at which T = MEC and 
S = 0. 
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END NOTES 
 
1
 See, for example, Galitano and Yoder (Galitano and Yoder 2010), Parry (Parry 1998), Sandmo (Sandmo 1975), and 
Metcalf (Metcalf 2009). 
2
 As Main (Main 2010) shows, the MEC per unit of output can be reduced by incurring some costs.  Taxing the 
pollution directly by means of an effluent charge, rather than employing a tax on the output of the good, would be 
more efficient.  In this paper, that possibility is assumed away for simplicity. 
3
 Parry (Parry 1998) points out that a more complete analysis would take account of the fact that subsidies must be 
paid for by distortionary taxes. 
4
 Policy makers are assumed to know the demand for the good and the supply curves of the two sources of supply, 
as well as the MEC for the polluting source. 
